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Bértola and Ocampo have written a concise yet informative book on the long-term development 
of Latin America. With 64 tables and 29 figures, it reviews a wide range of sources and data to 
assess the reasons why the continent is not part of the developed world. Rather than lagging 
behind in the long run, the authors argue that the continent went through a “truncated conver-
gence,” as periods of intense development alternated with others of crisis and stagnation. They 
investigate the drivers of this nuanced process and reject the widespread claim that Latin Amer-
ica is cursed to remain underdeveloped.  
The book follows the standard division of independent Latin America’s history into four pe-
riods: the half century after independence, during which states were weak and the economy 
lagged behind; the half century that preceded the Great Depression, when trade, capital inflow, 
and immigration boomed; the period between 1930 and 1980, when population grew rapidly 
and the state promoted industrialization; and the relatively recessive phase that followed thereaf-
ter, which combined democracy with economic liberalism. The authors also divide the region 
geographically in a well-established way: the mountainous countries with large indigenous 
communities, such as Mexico and Peru; the tropical lowlands that received African slaves, such 
as Cuba and the Brazilian coast; and the Southern Cone, where European settlers cultivated 
temperate crops. The authors show that the countries became more similar after the 1930s. Bra-
zil and Mexico grew thanks to their large domestic market and started to catch up with the rela-
tively rich Southern Cone. Matters changed again after the 1980s. Industrial exporting sectors 
appeared in Mexico and parts of Central America, while South America returned to its com-
modity-exporting vocation. 
This is a notable book in spite of its well-known framework for interpreting Latin America’s 
history and geography. It revisits the main ideas of the Economic Commission for Latin Ameri-
ca and the Caribbean (ECLAC) School and downplays the institutional causes of poverty pro-
posed by the highly influential New Institutionalist Economics (NIE). The main message is that 
world markets prevented the continent from catching-up –a conclusion that cepalinos such as 
Prebisch, Faletto and Furtado reached in the post-war era. Such an approach does not mean, 
however, that the book is outdated. On the contrary, it uses new research to contradict some of 
the NIE’s propositions. The authors show that Latin America grew more than new institutional-
ists had assumed in the aftermath of Independence. The myth of laissez faire during the first 
globalization (1870s-1930) is debunked. Trade policy promoted industrialization, which contri-
buted to that period’s economic growth. They also criticize the belief that Latin America is the 
world’s inequality champion today because of its colonial past –a claim that is often described 
as the leyenda negra. New long-term series show that inequality boomed during the first globa-
lization and the lost decade of the 1980s. On the other hand, Bértola and Ocampo combine ar-
guments from the ECLAC School with economic orthodoxy. They praise the consensus on 
sound fiscal accounts and price stability that emerged in the continent during the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, the authors go too far in the chapter on industrialization. In an effort to defend 
the policies implemented between the 1930s and 1970s, they conclude that the debt crisis of the 
1980s was the result of an external shock rather than the collapse of the continent’s industriali-
zation model. Such an interpretation implies that the model did not entail a severe balance-of-
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payments imbalance. Perhaps this is why they adopt the term “state-led” rather than “import 
substitution” or “inward-looking” industrialization. Strangely enough, Bértola and Ocampo 
present facts that point in other directions. They show that import coefficients fell and that states 
were less interventionist in Latin America than in Africa and Asia, not to mention the Soviet 
block. The text quotes contemporary cepalinos who criticized the emphasis on domestically-
driven industries and argued that governments should have promoted exports. The Asian tigers 
did so and performed well in spite of the world crises of the late 1970s. In Latin America, poli-
cies were indeed “inward looking,” which made the continent vulnerable to external shocks. 
Industrialization was what it was rather than what the ECLAC wanted it to be.  
The chapter on industrialization discards another widely accepted cause of the debt crisis: un-
sound fiscal policy and inflation. Bértola and Ocampo claim that high inflation was endemic 
“only” in the Southern Cone and Brazil. This is problematic because that region includes almost 
all the countries that invested in capital goods and heavy industry. Mexico was the exception in 
combining industrialization and price stability. Inflation was a major driver of social conflicts in 
South America, to which populist and military governments provided a number of different 
answers. The book barely addresses the causes and consequences of populism and dictatorships 
even though these regimes have deeply marked the continent.  
However, the authors do acknowledge that industrial policies had flaws. They argue that poor 
results in innovation and education prevented Latin America from carrying on growing. Matters 
could have been different if industrialists were politically stronger than the traditional rural 
elites. The problem was not the industry but the primary sector. Brazil was the only country that 
had a relatively strong industrial class, and it went deeper in the industrialization process. But if 
the relative power of industrial elites was so crucial, why did Brazil also get stuck in the middle 
income trap, together with the rest of the continent? Perhaps the lack of competition prevented 
innovation from flourishing and structural inequality deprived people from accessing good edu-
cation. These are new-institutionalist arguments that Bértola and Ocampo fail to refute. Never-
theless, such limitations do not compromise the book’s merit in confronting NIE’s monolithic 
views on Latin America with old ideas and new research. 
